


AIRPROX REPORT No 2018159

Date: 06 Jul 2018 Time: 1204Z Position: 5108N 00058W Location: Lasham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DR400	MI-8
Operator	Civ FW	Foreign Mil
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider		Farnborough
Altitude/FL	2400ft	2500ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Black, Yellow	Grey
Lighting	Strobes, Beacon, Landing light.	Strobes, Nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	10km
Altitude/FL	2000ft	~2000ft
Altimeter	QFE (1000hPa)	NK
Heading	360°	250°
Speed	120kt	110kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation		
Reported	50ft V/<100m H	2km
Recorded	100ft V/0.1nm H	



THE DR400 PILOT reports that he was engaged in a grid launch from Lasham using 4 tugs (3 DR400 and a PA25) and had launched around 20-30 gliders. He took off towing a Nimbus 3 sailplane and headed towards Alton because the glider pilot had requested to be over Alton at 2500ft. The glider was released at 2500ft and the DR400 pilot turned back towards Lasham and accelerated to an airspeed of 120kts. He flew in a straight line back towards Lasham planning a route that would avoid the other tugs towing out of Lasham and areas where he had seen gliders thermaling when he was on climb-out. Shortly after releasing the glider, while descending through 2000ft, he spotted movement out of his peripheral vision to the right of the aircraft, which turned out to be the main rotor of a helicopter. It appeared to be military transport, but not Royal Air Force and had two engines. It was about 300m away, tracking right-to-left across his track, directly to the right of his aircraft and slightly below it. Had he held his track, he would probably not have impacted the helicopter, but his tow-rope would, so he turned left to increase the separation between the tow-rope and the helicopter whilst continuing north and descending to clear out of its way. The helicopter did not appear to take any form of avoiding action, so he thought the crew probably hadn't seen him.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE MI8 PILOT reports that he was en-route and keeping to ATC instructions. He had on-board nav equipment to show him where the aerodrome zones were and was careful to keep clear. He saw a low-wing aircraft about 2km away, it was blue and making a very steep approach. He turned left to keep clear.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Odiham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVO 061150Z 35004KT CAVOK 26/12 Q1021 BLU=

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The MI8 was formally identified using the aircraft address field in the aircraft data box on the area radar replay. However, the events described in the report received from the MI8 pilot were not always consistent with those described by the DR400 pilot and as such the MI8 pilot may have been describing a different event.

At 1147.00 the MI8 pilot called the Farnborough controller, the controller instructed the pilot to squawk 0433 and a Basic Service was agreed.

At 1200.59 (Figure 1), the Farnborough controller issued the MI8 pilot with approval to transit the Odiham MATZ but instructed them to remain clear of Odiham ATZ and warned them of intense aerial activity at Lasham, which was 9nm ahead and active with multiple glider contacts. The MI8 pilot acknowledged this information.

CPA occurred at 1204.32 (Figure 2), with the aircraft separated by 0.2nm laterally and 100ft vertically.




Figure 1 - 1200.59



Figure 2 - 1204.32

The DR400 pilot was not in receipt of an ATS at the time of the Airprox. The pilot of the MI8 was in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS. A Basic Service is provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. This may include weather information, changes of serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, general airspace activity information, and any other information likely to affect safety. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot's responsibility.

In accordance with the requirements of a Basic Service, the Farnborough controller passed a timely warning to the MI8 pilot to expect intense aerial activity in the vicinity of Lasham and explained the location of Lasham relative to the position of the MI8. Therefore, the Farnborough controller discharged their responsibilities within the provision of a Basic Service and both pilots were responsible for their own collision avoidance.

UKAB Secretariat

The DR400 and MI8 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard¹. If the incident geometry is considered as converging, then the DR400 pilot was required to give way to the MI8².

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DR400 and a MI8 flew into proximity at 1204hrs on Friday 6th July 2018. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the DR400 pilot had just released a glider, was returning to land and was not in receipt of an ATS. The MI8 pilot was transiting passed Lasham and was receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar photographs/video recordings and reports from the appropriate ATC operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the actions of the DR400 pilot. He had just released a glider and was returning to Lasham to collect his next glider. Glider tugs typically fly a steep approach back to the airfield in order to use minimum power so that the engine can cool down, and to return as quickly as possible to ensure as many gliders can be launched within a certain time window. The Board wondered whether as a result the DR400 tug pilot had become somewhat task focused in his intent to return to the airfield as soon as possible, to the detriment of his look-out. The MI8 had been in his vicinity for some time prior to the Airprox, was maintaining its level and course, and it was for the DR400 pilot to give way to it, which he did by taking avoiding action, albeit later than desirable. Without an ATS the DR400 pilot would not have received any Traffic Information and although his aircraft was fitted with FLARM, this would only have given him warnings about other FLARM-equipped aircraft; had his aircraft been fitted with a P-FLARM, or something similar, he might have gained information from the MI8's transponder.

The MI8 pilot was a foreign national visiting the UK and some members wondered whether he would have been fully aware of the type of service he was receiving from Farnborough, and that being a Basic Service he was unlikely to receive specific Traffic Information other than the generic warning that he received about the possibility of gliders in the area. Members noted that the MI8 pilot had described the DR400 as being 2km away and the Board could not determine whether this meant that he first saw the DR400 2km away, or that he had seen a different aircraft completely. Although they couldn't be sure, they decided it was probably the former because there were no other tugs in the vicinity and he accurately described the steep approach of the DR400 as it descended into Lasham. If it was the DR400 that he had seen at 2km, members wondered why the MI8 pilot had not acted sooner to break the collision geometry, although the MI8 pilot reported taking avoiding action, it was not enough to be evident on the radar replay.

The Board briefly looked at the role of the Farnborough controller. He was providing a Basic Service to the MI8 pilot and had warned him about the intense aerial activity in the Lasham area. The Farnborough controller was not required to monitor the MI8 on the radar and, unless he saw the incident and believed there to be a risk of collision, was not required to pass Traffic Information. The Board surmised it was probable that the controller had not seen the incident on radar, otherwise he would have provided Traffic Information.

In determining the cause of the Airprox, the Board quickly agreed that it had been a late sighting by the DR400 pilot. However, the uncertainty in the Board's mind about when the MI8 pilot had seen the DR400 caused them not to make any assessment in respect of his sighting, although they suspected that it had been closer than the 2km he had reported. Turning to the risk, the Board were mindful of the

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

DR400 pilot's report that he had had to deviate from track so that his tow-cable did not impact the MI8. Accordingly, they assessed the risk as Category B; safety had been much reduced below the norm.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A late sighting by the DR400 pilot.

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Crew:

Situational Awareness and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because although the MI8 pilot had generic information about gliding at Lasham, neither pilot had any specific information about the other aircraft prior to the Airprox.

Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the DR400's FLARM could not detect the MI8.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the DR400 pilot managed to take avoiding action, albeit later than desirable.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](http://www.ukab.co.uk).